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Abstract 
Since the 1960s there has been an alternative move within theory of science towards 
an understanding, according to MacKenzie & Spinardi (1995) that techno-scientific 
knowledge is no longer to be viewed as objective – in the sense of being “subject 
independent”; neither is it context independent, and it is not determined by the rule of 
scientific method. Instead scientific knowledge is situated, it happens locally, it is person-specific, 
and scientists do not follow rules but specific courses of action determined by the specific research environment 
and epistemic culture in which they are included (MacKenzie & Spinardi 1995:44). In this paper, I 
will discuss this view with specific emphasis on mind its tacit nature with regard to knowledge, 
i.e. what the tacit of “tacit knowledge” is and how it is embodied in technoscientific practice 
– I will thus attempt to shed light on the mind and in particular the act of thinking that takes 
place before and during the formation of knowledge. However, the messy task of dealing with 
mediations may be a means to access that peculiar pre-conscious act we call thinking, which 
grounds rationality, and is a ground common to us all.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Science, technology, technoscience 
 
Today most sciences are technological practices. One example of a technoscience 
practice is radiology. The relationship between technological practices and sciences is 
obvious where several sciences overlap like for instance in “space-travel nanomedicine” 
where engineering, physics, and chemistry, pharmaceutics, and medicine come together 
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in the endeavor to create solutions for osteoporosis, cancer, and other illnesses that 
astronauts will be facing when they eventually are cruising towards Mars spending years 
in weightlessness and in an environment heavy with radiation (Nanoappsmedical.com). 
What connects technology and sciences are practices applied when technologies are 
needed as an extension of human action, like human perception can be extended through 
the use of fMRI or telescopes in space. What also connects is the specificity of skilled 
knowledge necessary for the practitioner to decode the mediation such technologies 
generates. 
Henryk Skolimowski stated in 1963 that science concerns itself with what is – and 
technology with what is to be (Franssen et al. 2013). Mario Bunge said that technology is 
applied science: technology is about action, action that is born out of theory (ibid), and 
this differentiates technology from the arts and crafts and is therefore of equal 
importance with science. Today it is, according to Franssen, not easy to distinguish 
between theoretical researches whether it is science or engineering. Technological 
research has become just like pure science (ibid). However, philosophy has only relatively 
recently become interested in engineering practices – especially analytical philosophy of 
technology. History of philosophy and science show us that sciences grew out of the 
philosophizing of people like Bacon and Boyle pairing mathematical description and 
empirical investigation and experimentation – introducing various devices and 
instruments (Rossi 2000). In our time, we say with Ihde, that “sciences are instrumentally 
embodied” (Ihde 2013), however, differently so in different sciences. Michael Polanyi wrote in 
1958 that science and technology is sharply divided by the distinct domains which form 
the transition between them. Technical processes that are so called applications of 
scientific knowledge do not contribute to science. A lot has been going on since Polanyi 
with the onset of sciences with different instrumental embodiments. Don Ihde has 
written extensively about a number of these different sciences, one example being 
modern astronomy, which is “outfitted with … ‘smart’ adaptive optics, very large arrays 
…illustrates one style of instrumentally embodied science – technoscience” (Ibid).  As 
Bart Gremmen states, “the interaction between scientific work and technological practice 
cannot not be limited to a mere exchange of results” (Gremmen 2013).  
So the question is: what facilitates the transition between science and technology 
for it to become an instrumentally embodied science practice? The short answer is: since 
modern science has become instrumentally embodied (Ihde), then sciences also consist 
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of mediations in need of interpretation. This presupposes skill-making, and know-how and it 
also clearly presents us with the presence of a tacit preconscious thinking, which is 
operating within perceptions. In the following we shall endeavor to go into a few 
different approaches to the tacitness of preconscious thought in order to understand a 
couple of the complex processes of mind during the interpretation of technoscientific 
meditations. 
 
2. Creating content through interpretation  
 
Human interaction with reality is necessarily perceptual. What we encounter in 
our mind, what we understand is an interpretation, an enactment; it is a model of the outside 
world.  
Perception is not necessarily a process in the brain only – it is a skillful activity 
performed by us as whole beings, and involves bodily movement and the entire nervous 
system (Noë, 2004:2). We acquire know-how, which we apply effortlessly to create 
interpretative models of what is “out-there”. Models are suggestions of how reality may 
look like. All interpretative models are kind of “work in progress” since people are in a 
dynamic interplay with their surroundings at all times: we continuously move around, 
touch, smell, hear and see things from various perspectives and framings.   
Hence, perception is often described as the capacity for comprehension, i.e. 
comprehension of a given environment based on the sensory information. However, this 
comprehension is not purely sensory as perception is more complex than being reduced 
to passive reception of stimuli from our senses. What we perceive through our senses is 
filtered through layers of memory, expectations and learning, thus linking perception to 
previous and present interpretations which reflects back on how perception of reality is 
interwoven with our knowledge, language and history, with our personal fears and bias, 
with befindtlichkeit (Heidegger) and with doxa (Plato).  
Hermeneutics can fruitfully be partnered with a concept of perception within the 
context of a dialogue. In a meeting between two or more people, the process of 
understanding hinges not only on speech, on spoken words, but on mimic, body 
language, silence, multi-sensory and intellectual reactions, knowledge, and the physical 
surrounding. 
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This will assist us in learning to make what is implicit explicit, to better decode 
what we perceive, enhance our perceptions whereby we can gather more knowledge from 
what we look at and participate in and identify signifiers prevalent in the dialogue. It can 
finally help open an experience of presence, of being-Now – since only the present, the 
now of just being, is the actual real. This is always the moment when interpretation and 
sense-making happens. 
First of all, we find a hermeneutical structure at the core of human interactions 
and human meaning-making. Our activities of daily living reveal continuous attempts at 
understanding everything that surrounds us. In order to work a computer, we need an 
operational understanding of the software program we use.  
Second of all, the physical human body cannot be detached from our interactions 
and interpretations. This includes using all the senses of the body and allowing ourselves 
to be informed this way. Our world is an embodied world from which understanding, 
knowledge, or know-how cannot be isolated or viewed as separate entities devoid of 
contextuality, intentionality, and physicality. Interpretations are incarnate. We are born 
interpreters. Thus, hermeneutics is more than a speech act or text analysis – we navigate 
reality already equped with the ability to interpret: infants immediately begin probing their 
environment for comfort and nourishment. Our bodily existence plays a crucial role in 
the production of meaning; we perceive meaning as we are producing it. 
Scientific perceptual habits have changed over the last 200 years. The reason for 
this may be that we are – as scientists or radiologists – looking at different things. We are 
trained differently, our practices are different. In relation to scientific imaging we do not 
apply illustrative drawings anymore; we develop our perceptual skills by repeated 
interpretative readings of images (Daston & Galison 2007; Friis 2015). Scientific 
observations, both before and after image technologies, are incommensurable activities 
partly because objectivity and subjectivity has, according to Daston and Galison, changed 
places. However, according to Heidegger and Gadamer, subject and object, instead of 
changing places, are merging during the process of interpretation. This is because the 
specific historicity of the interpreter becomes a necessary precondition for the 
understanding of the object at hand. This is a change from the artist-empiricists’ naïve 
notion that the content of visual perception is directly given. One reason for this may be 
that we are culturally programmed to use our eyes and focus our gaze in certain ways 
when we look at things. Another reason may be that we have become genetically enabled 
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through the long history of human evolution to interpret the environment perceptually. 
Thus, a relativizing aspect enters together with the individual observer and his or her 
specific situated perspectives, that is to say, how he interprets depends on his acquired 
skills, i.e. his upbringing, training and cultural background. How the observer is geared 
to apply his ability to interpret depends on his individual mix of biological programming 
and skills acquired through cultural integration. This can be understood the following 
way. 
The eye is an interface between mind and object (environment/event/image). As 
such, the eyes are part of a complex processing unit to trace and identify change, features 
and form. What we are programmed to interpret is from a biological perspective a three-
dimensional environment. Contour, texture and regularity are invariant properties; these 
properties, which are invariant under different perspectives, allow us to single out objects 
and experience them as constant and as something that exists separate from us (Barry 
1997). There are of course an unknown number of perceptual properties or abilities on 
which culturally acquired skills rest. The phenomenon of “filling-in” is probably the best 
known of them. How important filling-in is can be explained by pointing to the time lag 
that exists between “actually happening” and “experienced as happening.” In order to 
compensate for the temporal gap between the actual event and the awareness of it, the 
brain has to fill-in information to act on from past experiences. As Barry writes: “What 
the brain does (…) is to utilize billions of synapses to access the whole of memory and 
to instantly recognize invariance, integrate it, generalize from it, and extend itself through 
analogy” (Barry 1997). In other words, filling-in is thus an aspect of the act of 
interpretation; it is an intuiting of what is in actuality happening based on experience, i.e. 
deep neural memory.  
If we now add technologies – with the accompanying technological “noise” 
adding artifacts such as white spots or shades into the image – and in addition changing 
cultural frameworks such as personal interests, political ideology, religious beliefs, school 
and influence from teachers and parents, socio-economic background, relatives and 
friends, literature and media, and scientific training, we can begin to fathom the variety 
of external influences on interpretation (in all of this, it is necessary to include theory-
ladenness and non-relevant bias). All of these relativizing aspects are influencing the 
perceptions of the scientific observer, the clinician or the radiologist. These individually 
varying influences constitute an addition to the experiential background referred to by 
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Barry – there must be a horizon for experiences to guide awareness in order to act – there 
is no one conductor conducting the symphony of synaptic charges, but only the 
neurological symphony in its fullness and, perhaps, some sort of synchrony among parts 
(Barry 1997).  
 
3. The “background” of tacit interpretative knowing 
 
The complex background mentioned above that is an integral property of all 
reflective and analytical thinking, is non-representational and tacit, and an element in all 
“data” processing. This stage of pre-conscious thinking is about creating meaning and 
understanding and is thus informing the observer. In other words, it is the actualizing 
meaning-making “act” per se in the mind of the observer. It precedes and establishes that 
which is going to appear as specific colors or tastes in conscious awareness. Since there 
are no “homunculus – no internal observer gifted with the capacity to faithfully mirror the 
‘real’” (Radman 2012), we have no direct perceptible or cognitive access to the physical 
reality that appears as happening here and now. Instead there are multiple cognitions 
processing information from the senses up against one or more sources (which sources 
are chosen is immanent to the process itself). In agreement with Radman – and Kant, we 
somehow “start from the inside”, from a more or less relevant starting “schema” (Ibid). 
The processing taking place is to discover and recognize the actually given, which requires 
that we already somehow know how to deal with data, that is, to transform the input to 
information. We are constantly shaping our perspectives on what is to become our 
conscious content (ibid). 
Pre-conscious processing transcends the rational activity of the self. Yet, 
preconscious thinking underlies all rational thought as it is the process enabling the 
content of rational analysis. Rational knowledge is knowledge about how to solve 
practical or theoretical problems coherent with specific realities like particle physics or 
the topic of knowledge within analytic epistemology; it is also for instance arrangement 
and rearrangement of observables. These are operations especially useful in innovation, 
development, and implementation of technologies; and rational procedures requires a 
great deal of calculation, imagination, analysis, reflection, planning, and systematization.  
Of course, there have been put restrictions on this kind of thinking in order to 
escape speculation and conjecture – we need only point to the A. J. Ayer (1956; 1973) 
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and his emphasis on the visual aspects of the physical world as the only container of real, 
i.e. observable, components and which we therefore are allowed to operate with in 
scientific theorization.  
Rationality is a matter of applying the correct method. An example of this is 
Føllesdal’s (1979) attempt to replace the hermeneutical method with the hypothetical-
deductive method (H-DM). Føllesdal is in this paper particularly critical towards 
Habermas, which, in his view, is restricting the H-DM to the natural sciences – in 
Føllesdal’s view it can perfectly be applied to meaningful material like texts and works of 
art (Friis 2016). Even though Føllesdal aim at replacing hermeneutics his interest is the 
rationality of the method and not the understanding of the event, which he downplays altogether, 
perhaps because of Gadamer’s insistence that any understanding is itself an event that 
suddenly happens and thus escapes rational conscious control and manipulation. Føllesdal 
believes the process of “interpretation” must be controlled by logic, in Føllesdal’s case, 
the logic of decision theory, H-DM, and game theory – “(…) no satisfactory study of man can 
take place without game theory” (Føllesdal 1979).  
Føllesdal does not believe that humans are irrational or that there are any reasons 
to think that persons are driven by unconscious powers. Human agents act as rational 
agents in the sense of decision theory (Føllesdal 1979; Friis 2016). First a person considers 
the alternatives which he believes to be possible in the situation at hand. Thereafter he 
chooses from among these alternatives one which in view of his values and beliefs 
concerning probabilities maximizes his expected utility (Føllesdal 1979). The deduction 
or conclusion takes place within the context of decision theory analyses, a rational affair 
with no unknowns – and where the hermeneutical circle – which is, according to 
Gadamer (2007), where and when during the interpretation the dichotomy between 
subject and object dissolves – is replaced by the gradual testing of test implications 
following logically from the proposed hypothesis (Friis 2016). In other words, to have a 
rational interpretation of a person’s actions, it is required that “(…) a rational individual 
who is placed between a number of alternatives to be realized at time t, makes his choice 
according to transitive preferences at t” (Føllesdal 1979). In order to be able to conclude, 
then, we expect a person’s preference to be consistent over time. This means not, says 
Føllesdal, that a person does not change his preferences; we would like to understand why 
he changes them. Rationality demands that preferences are guided not only by present 
desires (Føllesdal’s own word), but by his concerns of his own future (Friis 2016).  
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The one-sidedness of rationality, as exemplified above, worried Martin 
Heidegger. Heidegger had since his 1929 lecture What is Metaphysics critically confronted 
Western philosophical and scientific culture for its cultivation of rationality. Its 
understanding of human thinking is one-dimensional and dualistic. Western culture has 
forgotten how to think. Rationality is nothing but a peculiar framing of the mind – like a 
straitjacket is a certain kind of forced “framing” of the body. The way we in the West 
have become accustomed to think about thinking is equal to forgetting what thinking 
really is about. 
Modernity’s notion of thinking means method. Rational thinking is, as seen in 
Føllesdal, a means to an end. We don’t ask, like Heidegger, what should we think? This 
peculiar thinking dismisses everything that falls outside of formalisms and logic (Robbins 
2014). According to Robbins – and Heidegger, rational thinking inevitably becomes 
circular: it becomes part of the Gestell – the ordering of resources for the development 
and use of technologies in the pursuit for progress and prosperity.  
Heidegger must have had some experience of the development and effects of 
technologies during both of the two World wars – technologies that were developed and 
enhanced continuously to exterminate and destroy. The frenzied rebuilding after WWII 
introduced another destructive aspect of technological innovation – the speed of 
development, and the loss of control of the consequences. In his last interview – in Der 
Spiegel, conducted in 1966 but published five days after his death in 1976 – Heidegger 
said that “technicity increasingly dislodges man and uproots him from the earth (…). We 
don’t need atomic bombs at all – the uprooting of man is already here. All our 
relationships have become merely technical ones.” Heidegger also referred to the French 
poet Rene Char that in a conversation had told to him “… the uprooting of man that is 
now taking place is the end (of everything human), unless thinking and poetizing once 
again regain (their) nonviolent power” (Der Spiegel 1976). 
In philosophy nothing really changes, the metaphysics is still intact – one-
dimensional rationality is still inherently part of the school curriculum, of philosophical 
and scientific thought. In his time Heidegger focused his attention on meditative 
thinking, that is, a thinking that cannot be separated from Being, that which is. It is this 
reality of “non-separation” in the “is” of the actual reality of thinking and Being that has 
been forgotten. The actuality of the living present, that which is and thinks and meditates 
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and which is attunement and engagement, in other words, the reality which just is that is 
forgotten.  
To forget of this “ground” we all stand on as living and breathing beings, is to 
withdraw from Being, which is to withdraw from that thinking which is, and instead it 
becomes reflective. This is thinking that has become blind to its preconscious ground, 
and that has made it – not impossible – but difficult for itself to be a purposeless 
thoughtfulness, that is, a thinking “without why” (Caputo 1971). It is the inevitable 
transformation of the background of the individual human by an increasing technological 
dependency that Heidegger feared. A one-dimensional thinking in oblivion of its ground, 
trained in calculative data-processing, finds itself preoccupied with technologies. A 
thinking that is designing, building, calculating, systematizing, and computing have 
become a “device to operate on a world of things already reified into a network of ends” 
(ibid). What has been brought into scientific thinking is an understanding of a mind 
whose activity is directed towards the world and the mastery of it. In Heidegger’s view, 
it is the practical and solution oriented scientific and technological rationality that draws 
the curtain. What was worrying for Heidegger was the unbridled optimism among natural 
scientists, that the natural sciences were the only way forward. For Heidegger, it was the 
objectifying, instrumental, and impersonal approach towards nature that constituted the 
threat to the future of humanity, as John Steffney writes “traditional rationality 
(metaphysics) has been concerned with beings and not with the illumination process as 
such, with ontic matters at the expense of ontological ones” (Heidegger 1966; Steffney 
1977).  
Heidegger’s critical view on rationality and its role in technological development 
and science creates both challenges and opportunities. One objection to Heidegger could 
be that we may be blinded but only temporarily so: we are perpetually tapping into the 
primordial ground of mind itself – we are in so many way always informed by it as it is 
always the present itself and thus is also the actuality generating faculty of mind.  Now 
and then we all of a sudden become aware of its existence.  
There is a certain “dualism” present in Heidegger’s thinking since he is operating 
within the dichotomy of either calculative thinking or meditative thinking – the first one 
bad the second good, without trying to integrate the intertwined parallelity of these two 
modes of thinking during processing or interpretation. It seems that Heidegger, it has 
been argued for instance by Steffney (1977), was not able to overcome the metaphysics 
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he aspired to transcend. Yet Heidegger’s insight on the matter, his difference from 
traditional philosophy, his rather mystical approach to the relation between Being and 
thinking may build upon other sources than even meister Eckhart: “foundational thinking 
starts only when we have experienced that reason (…) is the toughest obstacle to 
thought” (ibid). Heidegger’s insight thus rest on his personal experience, his 
enlightenment or satori, and not forget, the influences of Hinduism, Theravada 
Buddhism, Mahayana Buddhism – especially Zen Buddhism and the Daoism of Lao Tzu 
(Caputo 1971; Steffney 1977; Scharff 1978; May 1996; Lin 2008).  
In the paper by John D. Caputo (1971) we can see that Heidegger situates his 
own sense of thinking within an understanding of man as not only preoccupied by being 
but also that he has an intimate relation to Being: “thinking must only stay ‘open’ to being 
and be ready for the advance in which it will disclose itself to man. Dasein must neither 
seek nor question but only wait.” In opposition to this fundamental act or non-act of 
openness, Heidegger places Kant, which operates with Being “subjugated to the 
categories and prescriptions of rational thought and therefore to the ‘demands’ – or 
‘wishes’ – of the thinking subject.” This openness in Heidegger’s perception of “the most 
concrete reality” is in Nishida’s thinking termed “nothing” – a reality which we “forget” 
through our constant objectifications and abstractions (Krummel 2017). This is 
Heidegger’s Being. In both thinkers this is nothing but a possibility and simultaneously 
also an act open to and in fact, as act, closing or overcoming the gap of otherness in order to 
know the object. This is pure experience in the sense that here we have to do with mind 
– which is Being perceived as the originary pre-cognitive primal non-distinction, which 
is before the advent of reflection where the dichotomy of subject-object takes place (ibid). 
Thus it is, according to D.T. Suzuki, “(t)he power of dichotomizing (that) has made us 
forgetful of the source in which it preserves its creative potentialities” (Steffney 1977), and 
as Iris Murdock puts it: “(…) we have an ‘unconscious mind’ (…) there is no general 
chart of that lost continent. Certainly not a ‘scientific’ one” (Murdock 1973). The 
dichotomy between conscious rational knowledge and tacit knowledge, like the subject-
object duality, is in Heidegger’s opinion something we must transcend – as Suzuki states 
“knowable knowledge is relative, while unknown knowledge is absolute and 
transcendental and is not communicable through the medium of ideas” (Steffney 1977), 
in other words rational knowledge is relative but pre-conscious mind is not – especially 
when we become aware that we have “something” that is thinking for us and that we 
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have no conscious control over it! We cannot with our will change that which appear 
before us as it is already determined. We can only give in to it. We are now aware of its 
absolute presence. Tacit knowledge is practical in the sense that it always is applied to the 
actual and immediate real – we don’t have to reflect, its knowledge simply presents itself 
to us through action, feeling, or skill-performance. 
Many neuroscientists, like Donald Hoffman, also claims that there is no such 
thing as a direct perceptual access to reality – all perception is itself mediation of something 
and that something is not a truthful representation of the contents of the world 
independent of us – everything we think we see, is the result of evolutionary and cultural 
pre-programming of the brain and the nervous-system. So, in view of the accelerated 
technological innovation and development – we may have to concede to Heidegger and 
admit that what we let ourselves in on with the technologies will in turn influence our 
lives in a way we are not ourselves always aware of when interacting with them. Through 
this perspective, all we see and relate to – whether it is nature, people, thoughts, 
conversations, or information – are mediations or rather interpretations originating 
within the dual aspects of our thinking tacit as well as analytically. What has been brought 
over from the technical handling of tools is the ability to handle the tools in a way that 
does not strain our capacity to perceive, to move around, and to think. This is the tacit 
way of the mind – veiled and in the background – it is that which thinks for us and on which 
our lives depend. 
This background is a directedness of the cognitive system at work – which are all 
our experiences, motivations, expectations, necessary in order to make sense of whatever 
stands in front of us as – it is a “precondition for shaping a perspective on what is going 
to turn out to be mental content” (Radman 2012:226). Most of what we do we do 
effortlessly, whether it is something physical or mental. Many actions are automated. All 
knowledge-processes are also, fundamentally speaking, automated in that they are always 
informed from the background.  
When Nietzsche stated that there are no facts, only interpretations, he was 
unknowingly pointing to psychology, in his own time only a promise yet a promise that 
according to Richard Tarnas was about “that … unconscious part of the psyche (that) 
exerts decisive influence over human perception, cognition, and behavior (…)” (Tarnas 
2010:422).  Tarnas is of course referring to the grand masters of modern psychology, 
Freud and Jung. And since Freud it has become a quite common place understanding of 
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mind and ego as something we do not have any conscious control over (ibid). It is true 
that Freud took Kant further by recognizing that appearances are not necessarily 
objective and that these appearances are unconsciously determined by the human 
observer and that which conditions him. According to Tarnas, Freud’s “discovery of the 
unconscious collapsed the old boundaries of interpretation … Kant was correct when he 
saw that human experience … was permeated by a priori structures (even though they 
were) to narrow and simplistic” (Tarnas 2010:423).    
Also Cormac McCarthy has written about the unconscious:  “the unconscious is 
a machine for operating an animal” (McCarthy 2017). He continues to say that all animals 
have an unconscious. The unconscious is a biological system of approximately 2 million 
years (for humans), whereas the ability to use language and think analytically is about 
100.000 years. The term unconscious has a psychological ring to it; to term it the “pre-
conscious” is better since pre-conscious emphasizes it as an activity prior to that which 
appears in consciousness. The process of thinking is mainly a pre-conscious affair. It 
solves math problems without using paper and pencil, without using numbers – we just 
don’t know how – yet. This process is in McCarty’s words “a mystery opaque to total 
blackness” (ibid). The neural storage of information, of experience, and of knowledge is 
enormous. We have read numerous papers and books and we can discuss these (not all 
but some) without having to remember the wording of the text, we remember images – 
the favored presentation mode of the pre-conscious (ibid).  
 
4. Psychology and the Modes of Information Processing and Corresponding Memory Systems 
 
In spite of what Heidegger, Suzuki and others say about the impossibility of 
science to even getting close to an explanation or description of the preconscious mind, 
it must be stated that science has at least tried to explain some of the phenomena of 
preconscious mind. However, the more technical sounding notions of “knowing how” 
(non-articulated/impossible-to-articulate knowledge) and “knowing that” (propositional 
knowledge) were first taken up by the Analytical philosopher Gilbert Ryle in 1949. 
However, it was Michael Polanyi (Polanyi 1958) who later developed the notion of 
“knowing-how” and termed it “tacit knowledge”, and subsequently also made it a central 
characteristic of technology. Although “tacit knowledge” in the analytical sense is a 
practical and effortless “thinking”, it definitely taps into that unknown territory we here 
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have termed the preconscious, and by others nothing (Nishida), Being (Heidegger), or unknown 
knowledge (Suzuki). 
Interestingly, the two forms of knowing can be seen in relation to recent 
psychological research on two distinctly different processing modes of mind, which is, 
the fast thinking and the slow thinking that synchronizes with two memory systems. One system 
slowly learns general regularities, whereas the other is a sudden grasp of unique events 
(Smith and DeCoster, 2000). Generally speaking, there is activity prior to the knowing-
how; this is a complex of activities needed in order to know and to act. One is a quick 
and effortless processing, which rests on embodied prior associations; the second is an 
effortful processing mode (ibid).  To be more explicit, the reason we humans have two 
memory systems is to tackle two functionally conflicting and incompatible demands 
(Ibid; McClelland et al., 1995; Sherry & Schacter, 1987). One demand is to “store” 
information slowly so that memory as a whole reflects a large sample of experiences. 
Smith and DeCoster explains that the reason for this is that long-term knowledge and 
experiences can at least partly be based on typical properties of the environment. To 
accomplish this, we need a slow-learning memory system. The other demand is for fast 
learning of new information. This is to remember new experiences perhaps after only 
one occurrence. The fast-learning memory system is important because one sole 
experience on the slow-learning memory system would not be enough for it to keep and 
retrieve that information on a future occasion. The fast-learning memory system rapidly 
constructs episodic memories in order to connect information about different aspects of 
an object in its context (Smith and DeCoster, 2000). Memories that are mediated by this 
system are explicit and conscious. The most notable difference between the two systems 
is the speed of learning and conscious access to memories, another difference that has to 
do with their different functions is that slow-learning and fast-learning accesses different 
types of information – for instance is slow-learning concerned with regularities, the fast-
learning system, on the other hand, records details of events that are new and interesting, 
attending more to the unexpected (ibid). 
There is interaction between the two systems. MacClelland et al (1995), states that 
consolidation is the most important one, which means that new memory is transferred 
by repetition from the fast-learning to the slow-learning system. Consolidation itself is 
slow so that new information will become integrated in the slow-learning system without 
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disrupting previous learning (MacClelland et al., 1995; Smith and DeCoster, 2000).  This 
is what is referred to as skill-making and tacit knowledge.  
The two memory systems relate to two different modes of thinking. The two 
modes of cognitive processing draw on the memory systems in very different ways. One 
form of thinking is by Smith and DeCoster called associative processing, others call it 
“system 1” (Kahneman 2011), or “automatic human information processing” (Schneider 
& Shiffrin 1977). Common for them is the distinction between the two processing 
systems. Associate processing or system 1 is drawing information directly from the slow-
learning system. It performs as an automated response, it is fast and pre-conscious and 
inherent within the perceptual pre-conscious processes of pattern-completion, 
recognition, and filling-in. For instance, after many experiences of certain type of similar 
phenomena inductive knowledge is formed, this knowledge is used to fill in information 
about characteristics that has previously been experienced rapidly and automatically in 
situations that resemble the current one (Smith and DeCoster, 2000).  This mode of 
thinking draws from the slow-learning memory system and performs intuitively, 
effortlessly and tacitly.  
Heidegger would express the context dependency differently – he is not talking 
about automated responses, although in his What is Called Thinking (1968), man possesses 
the possibility to think because man is only capable to think if he is inclined to do it – the 
issue here is that it depends on the context, what inclines man to think: “Memory is the 
gathering of thought. To what? To what holds us, in that we give it thought precisely 
because it remains what must be thought about.” Automated response is what happens 
when we incline toward what in itself is to be thought about, as Heidegger states: “Only 
then are we capable of thinking” (ibid). 
The analytic and reflective system 2, the rule based processing mode, is slow and 
applies rules to manipulate problems and find solutions. This mode of thinking uses both 
memory systems (Smith and DeCoster, 2000). Smolensky (1988) writes that this 
analytically reflective mode of thinking uses knowledge transmitted by culture and 
represented through symbols as its “program”. It is based within language, which draws 
on both underlying memory systems.  
Another take on system 1 and system 2 is Daniel Kahneman. He states that 
problems at hand may be so difficult that system 1 and the slow-learning memory system 
cannot come up with a skilled solution; system 1 still comes up with an answer but an 
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answer to a simpler and related experience of the original problem at hand. The solution 
could then be to act on likes and dislikes. In other words, emotions are not only a 
surrogate solution, the next best thing when there is no corresponding experiences or 
skills to act out; it is a reason to act in itself and have survival value. We act on likes and 
dislikes, fear or love, we decide and act within the context of the situation that happens, 
intuitively, sometimes an adequate response sometimes, as Kahneman points out, an 
easier decision on a related situation in the absence of that particular corresponding 
experience within the slow-learning memory system. The thing is, according to a new 
theory by a group of neurology and psychology researchers lead by psychologist Ezequiel 
Morsella, is that it is the result of thinking and not the process of thinking, which suddenly appears in 
consciousness – the activity of the mind is never conscious (Miller, G.A. 1962; Lashley, K.S. 1956; 
Morsella et al 2015). This means, according to these researchers, that consciousness itself 
is not in possession of any activity, it is a passive frame for that pre-conscious process 
that just interactively took place in the brain and the nervous system. This means that at 
every moment new mixtures of content will be present in the conscious field (Morsella et al 2015). The 
information is context specific and arises automatically in a “no-self-generated manner” 
(ibid). Contents have various sources, some come from top-down processes, other from 
unconscious intersensory interaction, and these contents may not have anything to do 
with each other or to the ongoing event. Consciousness therefore appears as a continuous 
feed, this feed is necessary in situations of conflict, however, it is still on when there is 
no conflict – and not to forget, these objects and needs that arise are perceptual-like 
(ibid). The content of consciousness thus is constructed only by pre-conscious action, as 
options.  
 
5. The “tacit” in clinical-technological practice  
 
Specific skills that are necessary in a technoscientific practice are, as shown above, 
often just as much limitations on as they are necessary preconditions for interpreting the 
technological output. Skills are usually transmitted from person to person (MacKenzie & 
Spinardi 1995). MacKenzie & Spinardi claim that “science rests upon specific, hard-to-
acquire, tacit skills” – which in a sense makes science a local endeavor and scientific 
knowledge local knowledge (ibid). This impertinent claim becomes obvious when we 
observe radiologists, which have to learn from older and more experienced colleagues, 
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then their practice comes to embody a species of share methodology and that has enabled 
the radiologist to identify patterns and irregularities. This specific kind of methodology 
or interpretative systematics is always learned at the workplace by tediously copying the 
practice of the person in charge of the training (Friis 2016). The same goes for skills 
needed to communicate diagnosis. How to formulate a report, and what language to use, 
is something that is copied from archived reports and from more experienced colleagues 
at the ward – and so it is at most hospitals, they all have similar although somewhat locally 
diverging epistemic cultures where skills and know-how are transmitted through learning-
by-doing and never-ending practice. If skills are not practiced they will be lost 
(MacKenzie & Spinardi 1995).   
Interpretation in radiology is a detail-focused observation method. The 
interpretation or systematics is about recognizing and identifying patterns in the image. The 
tacitness of interpretation in radiology is specialized in comparison to the general ability 
of pre-conscious interpretation. Its specific tacitness – the systematics, the visual cues, 
pattern recognition – is underlying all practice, from the reading of the image itself to 
discussions with peers and reporting of findings. This specific tacitness or type of 
interpretative performance includes at least two important elements. To be a bit more 
specific, technologies – the scanner or x-ray machines, the software used to manipulate 
the image, the RIS for patient data, the PACS or picture archiving communication system 
to actually see the images and to file the oral report that is sent for transcription. The 
mediation undergoes thus several processes before it reaches the eyes of the radiologist 
as a visual 2D or 3D image – and the radiologist can use the PACS to zoom, add light, 
background contrast, and other qualities in order to enhance the performance of the 
interpreter (Friis 2015).  
MRI scans provide a completely different type of visual information than x-rays. 
The MRI image is a sequence of a much larger area of the body – and the view is from 
inside the sequence. By right-clicking the mouse and move the cursor over the image, the 
radiologist can “travel” up and down through the sequenced body (ibid). The radiologist 
selects several image sequences from the same patient, compares and then describes what 
he sees. If there is doubt he will call one of his colleagues to discuss the images.  
The radiologist typically begins to have doubts when patterns appear that do not 
immediately look right. Then the image is “teasing”, which is to say that the image 
harbors shadows that the radiologist suspects gestalts abnormally, i.e. creates an illusion. 
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These shadows can also be exterior to the image, i.e. “artifacts in the image” created by 
the position of the patient who might have moved himself a little during the shot. In such 
cases is the experience of the radiologist essential (ibid).  
The other element is, as seen, the systematics. Konstantinou et al (2012) holds that 
it is important to painstakingly follow the acquired systematics because we neglect to pay 
attention to objects when there are many other objects occupying our attention. It is 
simply not good enough to have the sought for object in plain view in order to actually 
see it. Only a few objects need to be present to dislocate our attention completely, we stop 
paying attention to the object in front of us. Even trying to remember what we have 
noticed is enough to blunt our attention towards the visual field during the interpretation 
process (Friis 2015).  
During this process of interpretation, the perception is not a one-way system that 
transports information from the senses to the brain. According to psychologist E. Bruce 
Goldstein the case is rather that we are involved in an active explanation process that in 
all respects is hermeneutic, that is to say, that the perceptual process is cyclical. The visual 
system is thus generating a continuous stream of feedback and interaction between the 
various parts of the visual system: stimulus-experience-reaction. There may be some form 
of visual representations but also activity founded on embodied skills and practices. In 
other words, we are talking about a perceptual-bodily activity that probably is involved 
in all intelligent behavior (Friis 2015). The human visual system is accordingly an 
intelligent interpretive, opinion and order-generating system (Goldstein 1989; Barry 
1997; Noë 2004). 
So, what facilitates the transition between science and technology? The adaptable 
human mind and its ability to reshape out-look and know-how. Our mind has been and 
is adapting to an increasingly more complex world, where handling all sorts of 
technologies become skill-based and tacit, and using these technologies does not require 
much effort. Sciences themselves are nowadays multidisciplinary – technologies have 
become the backbone to its practice and thus a necessity to the outcome (Friis 2015).  
It may come a time when mankind will better understand what makes humans 
think in ways we today only can speculate about. We could for a starter push ourselves 
towards an awareness of what may happen to our minds as we continue to consolidate 
our dependency on technologies – our unavoidable partners, instruments and the technics 
deflect our attention away from what happens to ourselves. Shannon Vallor, in her great 
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book Technologies and the Virtues states, writes that we will need more than just better 
technologies. We will need better humans. Hence, we end up with Heidegger and his 
postulation “we forget to ponder.” Like him we can only point to that which informs our thinking 
and actions and pursue the disclosure of this ground as a possible theme for future research 
within philosophy of science & technology. 
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